Parliament is not a mere structure of bricks and mortar, but the supreme deliberative, legislative and representative institution of a nation. Parliament can perform its multifarious functions if endowed with a robust tool kit of accountability. Accountability is about instilling or reinforcing an ethos of legal compliance and efficient practices tempered by the consideration of fostering a sense of responsibility, transparency and good governance, which is at the heart of parliamentary oversight and scrutiny.
In the Indian parliamentary democratic system, there is no separation of power between the political executive and the legislature as the Council of Ministers is drawn from the legislature and their survival is contingent upon parliamentary support. Woodrow Wilson, who later became the US President, was enamoured of the parliamentary system where ‘ministers lead the Houses without dictating to them, and the ministers themselves be controlled without being misunderstood’.
The founding fathers of the Indian republic preferred accountability of the executive to the legislature over stability of the Government. But when the legislature is controlled and dictated by the executive, there is erosion of legislative power to hold the executive to account. The erosion of accountability is for a congeries of reasons. Not only have the number of sittings of Parliament come down alarmingly, the average duration of sittings too has decreased. The 17th Lok Sabha on an average had 55 sittings in a year, partly due to the pandemic. But the average sittings and the duration of sittings declined precipitously from the 13th Lok Sabha onwards. Even the Central Legislative Assembly under the Britishers sat for 74 days in a year.
This is deeply worrying if compared to the sittings of some of the leading parliaments of the world. Between the years 2003 to 2012, the UK House Commons sat on average for 140 days, US Congress for 136 days, the House of Commons, Canada for 110 days as against an average of 69 days of the Lok Sabha during the same period. The Conference of the Presiding Officers has recommended time and again to hold at least 100 sittings in a year. An unsavoury spectacle is the intermittent verbal tug of war between the Members and the Presiding Officers. The Presiding Officer is not a goal keeper of eith – er side but the supreme Umpire. He belongs to none or to all. The Chair is expected to be completely neutral, devoid of bitter partisanship and courageous enough to assert its authority, may be, at times, causing discomfort to the treasury benches.
In 1642, when King Charles-I stormed the House of Commons to arrest five MPs, Speaker Len – thall, displaying extraordinary cour – age, refused to reveal their whereabouts, uttering the famous words “May it please Your Majesty, I have neither eyes to see nor tongue to speak in this place, but as the House is pleased to direct me whose servant I am here”. The time for discussions on the Bills has been enormously squeezed. Thirty six per cent Bills were passed by the last Lok Sabha with less than an hour of discussion. During the 17th LS, 16 per cent Bills were referred as against 25 per cent during the 16th LS and 71 per cent during the 15th LS. Lord Hailsham, described the British Parliament as ‘Executature’- a legislative body under the control of the executive. When legislation is pushed through in Parliament without discussion or without hearing the side opposite, Parliament becomes ‘Executature’, a rubber stamp of the Executive.
There is a felt need that all Bills, except Appropriation Bill, the Finance Bill and small amendment Bills, must be referred to the Committees for comprehensive examination and consultation with the stakeholders. An unhealthy trend is the sudden and premature sine die adjournment of Parliament when vital issues of wider public concern are awaiting discussion. This is a sign of discomfiture and gives an avoidable occasion to the opposition to castigate the Government. Article 85 needs amendment to provide for at least 100 sittings of each House of Parliament in a year.
Similar provision for State Assemblies is needed, many of which meet hardly for 20 to 30 days in a year. MPs take an oath to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution but they failed to elect their Deputy Speaker during the 17th LS, though Article 93 ordains that the Lok Sabha shall, as soon may be, choose two members to be respectively Speaker and Dy Speaker. A command enshrined in the Constitution cannot be disobeyed by the House. There is no exception or non-obstante clause to Article 93. The Indian Parliament has a well-knit, allcom passing Committee system. A robust committee system demands a willing suspension of adversarial politics and display of commonality of purpose. It is said that the citadel never falls except from within. When a Committee gets polarised, it erodes the very edifice of the committee system.
If the malaise of polarisation persists, it will sound the death knell of the committee system. Some stark instances of polarisation deserve a mention. During the 15th LS, the PAC could not adopt their report on allocation of spectrum as the Committee got polarised. It was the first such instance in the otherwise golden years of the PAC. During the 16th LS, the Estimates Committee could not adopt a report on the metrics of measuring growth due to strong opposition from the Government members. The expulsion of a member during the 17th LS based on the report of the divided committee of Ethics is yet another egregious example. Passing of legislation after wholesale suspension of members poses a much graver danger to the edifice of any representative democracy. Democracies wither and perish when the institutional facade eviscerates the substance of democracy. Conventions have a great role in the working of Parliament and its Committees.
The Chair of the PAC goes to the principal opposition since 1967. The convention remains, gratifyingly, unbroken. But the convention of the chairs of the Finance Committee and the External Affairs Committee going to the opposition has since been side tracked. There is also a fond lament that the new Parliament building conspicuously lacks a Central Hall where Members of both the Houses met, cutting across political divides and ideological differences, and exchanged pleasantries and views in an informal atmosphere of mutual trust and camaraderie, without any fear of being quoted or seen together. There is a need to introduce the PM’s Question Hour, as in the UK and elsewhere in the Commonwealth countries.
It would really be a break from the colonial past, and inaugurate a new era in the Indian parliamentary annals. Also, there is a need for changing the nomenclature of Private Members’ business, which is a relic of the British Raj. All members are legislators and therefore have the inherent right to initiate legislative proposals. In fact, between 1951 and 1970, fourteen Bills by members, i.e., other than Ministers, were passed and enacted. Further, at least one day in a week needs to be earmarked for urgent issues sought to be raised by the Opposition.
The Rule of Procedure needs amendment to provide for convening Parliament and also to introduce and consider legislation when at least one third of the MPs so demand. This will help reduce disruption of normal proceedings of the House like the running of Question Hour and also significantly curtail the tendency to move adjournment motions. The challenges of accountability are the challenges of democracy and therefore Parliament must have a stronger and efficacious tool kit of accountability.
(The writer is a practicing Delhi-based lawyer and ex Addl Secretary of the Lok Sabha. Views expressed are personal)