China’s delicate and evolving role in Myanmar’s escalating civil war underscores the country’s shifting priorities in the region and the risks of balancing support for a faltering junta with the need for border stability. For India, which has its own shared boundary with Myanmar, China’s handling of the crisis is a critical case study on managing regional instability without compromising sovereignty or security. Beijing’s initial support for Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance, a rebel coalition fighting against the military junta, was partly an attempt to curb unchecked crime near the border. However, the alliance’s recent success in pushing back junta forces across significant borderlands has prompted China to reconsider its stance.
China has since sealed its border and halted key imports to rebel-held areas, signaling a preference for preserving a manageable status quo rather than an overthrow of the junta. The reasoning is simple: a collapse of Myanmar’s military could open pathways for Western-backed groups to exert influence, especially if the National Unity Government (NUG), a coalition supported by democratic forces and international allies, gains further ground. This balancing act is complex. China wants to avoid an escalation that could jeopardise its own economic interests, particularly with Myanmar serving as a vital link in its Belt and Road Initiative.
In line with this, Beijing has tightened control at the border, attempting to curb the alliance’s gains and discourage any advances toward key cities like Mandalay. For China, stability often comes before any ideological alignment, as is evident in its muted stance on the junta’s violent repression of civilian groups. China’s recent actions suggest pragmatism focused on maintaining control over the region’s political trajectory. For India, China’s involvement presents both concerns and lessons. While India, too, has maintained pragmatic relations with Myanmar’s junta for stability on its northeastern frontier, it is increasingly wary of the junta’s inability to govern effectively.
The rapid rotation of military commanders in Myanmar, especially in border regions, has led to disarray within the junta, eroding its capacity to counteract both insurgents and crime. Should the junta continue to fragment, India might face similar pressures on its own border regions, with an influx of refugees or spillover of regional insurgencies impacting states like Manipur and Mizoram. China’s influence, though intended to bring stability, may inadvertently deepen Myanmar’s turmoil if it pushes anti-junta forces to escalate conflicts elsewhere.
Beijing’s pressure on the Three Brotherhood Alliance to retreat in exchange for potential ceasefire negotiations could undermine the alliance’s momentum, emboldening the junta at a crucial juncture. The ceasefire, however, might ultimately serve only as a tactical pause, providing only breathing room for the junta. India should carefully observe how China’s calculated approach unfolds. India must focus on fostering a sustainable and inclusive political solution in Myanmar. India’s unique role in the region positions it to support a stable neighbour, balancing non-interference with efforts to facilitate dialogue and promote regional security without heavy-handed intervention.