The process of amending an Article must begin with at least 100 members of the Lower House or 50 from the Upper House of the Diet tabling a draft, which when passed by two-thirds majority of both Houses, needs endorsement through a national referendum by a simple majority.
Though an assertive China and provocations by Pyongyang strengthened Abe’s case to reform the Constitution, the peace winds blowing in the Korean peninsula makes his case tough as the security dynamics is seen have changed. Abe’s aim seems to remain unrealized.
The Japanese are not enthused about the issue of the Charter to be tampered with and do not see it as a priority, though the security issue remains a matter of concern. A number of surveys have shown that the majority of voters want to keep the pacifist ideals outlined in Article 9, despite Pyongyang’s provocations and an increasingly assertive China.
A survey by NHK in early 2018 showed that 31 per cent of respondents agreed with Abe that the SDF should be recognized as Japan’s military in the Constitution, while 23 per cent opposed the idea. Forty per cent were undecided. Another survey in early September by Asahi Shimbun showed social security and economy as the main concern, not the issue of doing away with Article 9.
The question that is likely to remain unanswered for some time is, can Abe succeed in realizing his aim? The journey is not going to be easy as Abe’s junior partner Komeito does not see any reason to be hasty in reforming the Constitution. Though Abe has been trying for the past three years to do this, he has not been able to do so as even prochange lawmakers are divided on the specifics. This could slow down the progress.
Abe is concerned that if his attempts fail, it would be a huge embarrassment for his political future and therefore unless he is confident to sail through the process, he would be deterred to take this important political move. At the moment, his biggest challenge is to build up political consensus among many parties.
Abe’s task is clearly cut out. He has to create the right environment for constitutional amendment and ensure that he takes advantage of roping in proamendment forces in order to secure a two-thirds majority in each chamber of the Diet in order to cross the first hurdle before he confronts the referendum issue.
In order to do this, Abe has to add a provision to ensure the legal status of the SDF while retaining Paragraph 2 of Article 9, which prohibits the nation from possessing war potential. Abe feels that if he leaves the Article’s current text unchanged, he can obtain support from other political parties that are critical of his plans. Yet, the controversy as to whether the SDF has “war potential” persists.
Abe’s opponent to the presidential race and main political foe, Ishiba, though is in favour of revising the Constitution, advocates complete deletion of Paragraph 2, which denies Japan “the right of belligerency of the state”. Para 2 of Article 9 states, “The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” As a former defence minister, Ishiba says that just adding the SDF to the Constitution would not eliminate all constitutional issues if the wording about the right of belligerency remains. If this happens, this would lead to a drastic review of the nation’s defence policy.
Ishiba holds the view that the nation faces more pressing issues that need priority attention of the government than the issue of revising the Constitution and there is no need to rush to tamper with the war-renouncing clause of the statute. According to him, the right (of belligerency) refers to a number of rules for countries engaging in war, such as how to treat prisoners of war.
Voters, however, cannot understand what the right means. However, Abe wants his LDP to present its own proposal to revise Article 9 to formalize the legal status of the SDF. He argues that the move would not change the nature of Japan’s military operations, but some left-leaning politicians and intellectuals have mooted the proposal, saying it could remove some of the strict legal restrictions on the SDF imposed by Article 9.
Interestingly, Ishiba had previously advocated a radical revision of Article 9. Such recourse would eventually allow Japan to fully exercise the right of collective self-defence, specifically the right to attack a third country assaulting an ally that has close ties with Japan. But now he admits that there is no national consensus and has argued against rushing with the move, seen as an apparent criticism of Abe’s policy.
Though doing away with Article 9 of the Constitution is uppermost in Abe’s wish-list, the process is not easy. In order to revise or do away with any Article, the Diet must first initiate a national referendum by securing support from two-thirds or more of the members of both houses of the Diet. Then, support from at least half of the voters in a national referendum is required to revise a constitutional article.
Article 96 is a clause in the Constitution of Japan specifying the process of making amendments. The Constitution has remained unchanged since coming into effect on May 3, 1947, and many politicians are calling for a revision of Article 96 so that they can begin revising other, more central articles.
Article 96 reads: “Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify. (2) Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.”
The LDP has long promised that it would not try to initiate any national referendum on constitutional revision unless major parties in the Diet agree to do so in particular the top opposition party. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition force, is strongly opposed to Abe’s revision proposal. Even the junior coalition partner of the LDP, Komeito, has reservations to Abe’s moves. It transpires, therefore, that Abe’s wishlist runs the risk of remaining a non-starter.
(Concluded)
The writer is former Senior Fellow, IDSA, and was until recently ICCR Chair Professor at Reitaku University, Japan. He is currently Lok Sabha Research Fellow.