Regardless of who occupies the White House, it is certain the next American President would inherit the new challenge of coping with the Russia-China-North Korea trilateral grouping. The possibility of cleaning up this mess, or at least designing a strategy to meet the new challenge, is uncertain. If Kamala Harris comes to power by defeating Trump, things could get messier.
In a possible continuation of Biden’s policy, the newly evolved trilateral relationship between the US, Japan and South Korea could get further impetus. This would mean more joint efforts to deal with North Korea and could include
(a) more joint and trilateral exercises,
(b) return of some US nukes to South Korea, and
(c) reconciling to the status of North Korea as a nuclear power as de-nuclearisation would no longer be feasible.
Harris would also demand that the allies be firm in enforcing sanctions imposed on North Korea with a view to punish Kim. What would be Trump’s strategy if he has a second stint? His optimism in his first term for arriving at a solution could be invigorated and he would be averse to risking chaos or war. Having met Kim twice in Singapore and Hanoi and a third time briefly at the DMZ during his presidency, the unpredictable Trump might feel emboldened to believe he has a personal rapport with Kim and fancy himself as a dealmaker. He is more likely to consider an alliance relationship with Japan and South Korea as less than sacrosanct and might demand more burden-sharing funds for stationing US forces in bases in Japan and South Korea.
This could also mean that he might agree with Kim’s demands and stop the joint exercises the US has with Japan and South Korea, withdraw some American forces and ease sanctions or even offer financial help to Kim with a view to support the economy. What Trump would expect from Kim in return is that North Korea freeze its nuclear build-up. That would be the first step to persuade Kim to rejoin the NPT, from whi – ch North Korea pulled out having signed once. If Harris comes to power, she will most likely continue Biden’s uncompromising policy on principles and wou – ld not be willing to be bullied by tiny North Korea. Such a scena – rio can make the situation bad but the status-quo might continue if the two sides do not indulge in further provocations.
If Trump comes to power and pursues the policies mentioned here, the situation could turn fluid and thus more unstable. What would be the impact of such a Trump policy on Japan and South Korea? The immediate perception that would develop in both the allies is that their insecurity would have been considerably increased. The trust deficit in the alliance relationship would deepen. Fearing abandonment by the US’ nuclear umbrella and the extended deterrence, both Japan and South Korea would rush to churn out their own nukes. The debate on invoking the nuclear option has already gained traction in South Korea. A similar situation could soon evolve in Japan as well. Both Japan and South Korea have the required materials and technology to produce nuclear bombs in quick time but are deterred from doing so by having joined the NPT regime.
If the perception develops in both these countries that invoking the nuclear option is the only means to secure their security, such a possibility would by no means be unthinkable. The global nonproliferation regime would have collapsed as a re – sult. What would be the possible reaction of Kim to these scenarios? His trust on Trump would have been hugely dented and he would no longer res – pond or be warm to Trump’s peace overtures. He would most likely see the decision of both Japan and South Korea to go nuclear as a serious security threat and consider preempting it by declaring war. That would be the deadliest scenario one would expect to unravel. The implication on the regional and world economy would be huge and damage could be incalculable if that happens. The world’s focus would then be on Kim and the challenge of world leaders would be on how to prevent a regional war developing into a potential Third World War as other countries shall inevitably be drawn into the conflict.
Fortunately, after airing his view that South Korea should consider developing its own nuclear weapons in response to the deteriorating security situation in the Korean Peninsula and the region, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol retracted from his statement after his summit meeting with Biden last year when the latter reinforced extended nuclear deterrence. This led Yoon to issue a statement that his country does not need its own nuclear weapons to deter threats from North Korea. He emphasised that cooperation with the US is key to staving off North Korea’s nuclear threat.
It is hoped that this thaw continues and prevents the situation from becoming messy. Since Yoon’s statement came after a week, North Korea unveiled details of its uranium enrichment facility for the first time, which is significant. Instead of seriously considering its own nuclear weapons, Seoul is likely to focus more on beefing up its defence capabilities as well as strengthening the enforceability of the US-South Korean extended deterrence plan as the best defence against the North Korean threat. Yoon is most likely to stand behind the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) established through the Washington Declaration in April 2023, based on which the US and South Korea are committed to promoting nuclear strategic planning as well as joint implementation through the Conventional Nuclear Integration.
Put briefly, the NCG is planned to prepare a strategy to survive and respond to a nuclear attack. The NCG framework was announced in April 2023 against the backdrop of growing demands in South Korea for its own nuclear weapons in light of North Korea’s escalating nuclear threats. The inaugural NCG meeting was held in July 2023 where leaders from the US and South Korea discussed information sharing, consultation mechanisms, and joint planning and execution to enhance nuclear deterrence against North Korea.
(The writer is former Senior Fellow at Pradhanmantri Memorial Museum and Library and MP-IDSA, New Delhi. He is also a former ICCR Chair Professor at Reitaku University, Japan)