Facile comparisons

representational image (iStock photo)


The glut of commentary on the Ukrainian crisis has led to some pretty facile comparisons in terms of who may try and ape ~ and how ~ the Russian military aggression against its neighbour.

The most common assumption is that the Chinese could well follow a similar gameplan against Taiwan, which they consider a “renegade province”, or even vis-à-vis India in Arunachal Pradesh most of which Beijing claims as its territory. There are even those who can only be termed Rambo-style strategists, a breed of commentators found mostly in Indian television studios, who reckon that the Russian invasion of Ukraine could serve as a template for Indian armed action against Pakistan.

It is indeed a slippery slope when the military tactics employed by Russia as it wages war against Ukraine are sought to be understood without the contextual clarity in which countries such as China and India operate. It results in increasingly far-fetched postulates being aired by all and sundry. China’s silent support ~ or at least lack of overt opposition ~ to Russia’s conduct does not stem from a desire for world peace or a more equitable global order.

It is entirely in Beijing’s interest that the US-led West, which had disentangled itself from West Asia and the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre to focus its strategic energies on the Indo-Pacific to counter the threat of a rampant China, be waylaid in Europe. That is a huge relief for Beijing which was getting cornered in the Asia-Pacific.

Also, the Chinese leadership is busy domestically in managing the most seminal economic-social reset since the Deng Xiaoping era and while it is resolute on Taiwan’s merger with the mainland, Chinese President Xi Jinping recognises that Washington would be more willing to puts boots on the ground and planes in the sky for Taiwan than it has been for Ukraine given the USA’s role as the guarantor of the post-World War II East Asian security architecture. Finally, in purely military terms, Taiwan’s tiny size when compared to, say, Ukraine, makes the salami tactics employed by the Russians unnecessary.

To put it bluntly, if the Chinese want to send troops in, they can do so in a few hours provided they are prepared for the escalation of cross-Strait tensions into armed conflict with the USA which such a move could result in. In this respect, there is no material change in the situation before and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

India’s neutral stance on the Ukraine crisis too is driven entirely by its national interest. The massive Indian dependence on Russian weapons systems and spares, as well as ensuring Moscow’s continued neutrality on Kashmir and Sino-Indian border tensions, is of vital import for India’s security and territorial concerns. Even the most hawkish of policy makers would agree there is no blueprint for New Delhi to follow vis-à-vis Pakistan emanating from the Kremlin’s policy towards Ukraine.