Six months post the demise of India’s first CDS (Chief of Defence Staff), General Bipin Rawat, in a tragic helicopter crash, the government has tweaked rules for appointing his reliever. As per the notification, any serving or retired Lt General or equivalent in the other two services, apart from serving or retired chiefs, is eligible for the appointment. He must be below 62 at the time of being appointed. Logically, this removes all retired chiefs, as they generally superannuate at 62. Gen Rawat was possibly an exception, who retired, at the conclusion of his tenure of three years, three months short of 62.
Officially, there is no mention of whether the next CDS should have headed his own service or tri-service command. Since a Lt- General superannuates at 60, all those who have retired during the past two years are eligible, alongside those serving, a fairly large pool for the government to select from. There being no other criteria, the government can push its personal choice.
As early as 16 December last year, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had announced that the process to appoint the next CDS had commenced. Press reports mentioned that eligible names had been for- warded to the appointments committee. The Minister continued making announcements on the subject at regular intervals, however, nothing moved. This led to speculation, some healthy, but largely unhealthy. It would have been ideal had the government nominated one of the service chiefs as the CDS as early as possible after the untimely demise of General Rawat. It may have upset the chain for that service, but that would have been preferable to amending norms.
The appointments committee, since 2016, comprises just the PM and the Home Minister. If they have been unable to decide on CDS for six months, it suggests this is not a priority for the government. It is also possible that the government found none of the recently retired service chiefs suitable for the appointment or they turned it down for personal or professional reasons. It is unlikely they were unsuitable as they have been selected by the same dispensation and are aware of the responsibilities and functioning of the CDS. If they turned down the government’s offer, it implies that there are major flaws in the design of the appointment of the CDS.
There are also inputs that the government is reassessing whether the CDS should simultaneously be the Secretary, Department of Military Affairs (DMA), an appointment lower in status or should this be assigned to the head of HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). This re-thinking suggests that the government has either had second thoughts on the role and tasks of the CDS or discovered that it’s initial earmarking of responsibilities was flawed. It is unknown whether this re-calibration in assessment has flowed from experience or objections from a host of veterans and strategic thinkers who have commented adversely on the CDS functioning as Secretary DMA.
The government, in its tasking of the CDS, has nominated him to be the first amongst equals where he and the service chiefs are concerned, which means that he would permanently head the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Further, he must be senior to them to enable pushing the agenda of a joint command, integrated planning and creation of theatre commands. In a tri-service establishment, the seniority of officers of similar rank is determined from the date of assumption of rank and not of service or commission. Thus seniority amongst four stars (service chiefs and CDS) is determined based on the date they assumed their appointment.
Hence, the CDS will be subordinate to current service chiefs unless a serving chief, preferably the senior-most one, is nominated. The government may be compelled to issue another corrigendum to its initial order to correct this anomaly. Simultaneously, the nominated CDS must believe that the Indian armed forces need to undergo transformation. It is also possible that the government has already decided who would be the next CDS and is now tweaking rules to push his appointment.
This is not the first time that the government has changed rules to favour individuals in the armed forces. In December 2017, it reduced the tenure of army commanders to 18 months from 24. The first beneficiary of this reduction was Lt Gen Ranbir Singh, who, as Director General Military Operations, was the face of the army, post the first surgical strikes carried out against Pakistani launch pads in September 2016, in retaliation to the Uri terrorist attack. He went on to command the Northern Command and subsequently was also a contender for the post of COAS, when General Bipin Rawat retired in December 2019.
The passing of the amendment possibly also implies that the appointment of CDS may not be based on merit but on political considerations. For an apolitical force, such a step conveys a negative message and places the appointee at a disadvantage from the outset. There were widespread objections when General Rawat was appointed chief superseding two seniors. In the current scenario, it could be even more damaging.
Taking six months to appoint a replacement, while pushing through a disliked also disadvantageous Tour of Duty (TOD) and manpower reduction policy, raises doubts. Was the government’s intention to push through schemes to which the forces had objected to a greater priority than appointing a CDS? Added to this is a view that the government was pushing TOD onto a system of separated services avoiding a unified response under a CDS, which would have added to difficulties. Now that the schemes are almost approved, the appointment of the CDS is around the corner.
It is known that justifications for delaying or avoiding selecting serving chiefs (past and present) may never become public. The silence of the government would only enhance speculation which could damage the image of the forces and the appointee. Safeguarding the ethos, image and apolitical nature of the forces is the responsibility of the government. The question is whether the government is fulfilling it or as is their norm, maintaining silence and ignoring criticism. Simultaneously, it must take wider views on its hare-brained scheme of TOD, prior to insisting on its implementation.