The Commissioner of Rail Safety (CRS), which is probing the Balasore triple train accident, has blamed the lapses at multiple levels in the Signalling and Telecom (S&T) department of the Indian Railways, in its report .
The report also highlighted the “lapses in the signalling-circuit-alteration” carried out at the north signal ‘goomty’ in the past and during the execution of the signalling work related to the replacement of electric lifting barrier for level crossing gate 94 at the station.
However, the senior officials of the railway ministry remained tight-lipped over the report.
Besides the CRS, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is also probing the Odisha train accident. The CRS, which comes under Ministry of Civil Aviation, is the central government entity that looks into railway safety and investigates railway incidents.
Sources said that AM Chowdhary, CRS, South Eastern Circle, who carried out the probe into the Balasore train accident in its report, has found that lapses at multiple levels in the S&T Department were responsible for the same.
The source said that the report highlighted that repair work was carried out at LC94 and disconnection was issued at 4.20 p.m. and re connection was given at 4.50 p.m. on the same day of June 2.
The source said that the report pointed out that after re connection, S&T staff was still working for signal circuit and it said that no modification was involved.
“A case of the rear-collision of Train No 12841 (Coromandel Express) with the goods train standing on the Up loop line (common loop) of the station came. The last two coaches of Howrah-SMVT Superfast Express, which was passing on the down main line of the station at the same time, were hit by the derailed coaches of Coromandel Express and capsized,” the report stated.
“The rear-collision was due to the lapses in the signalling-circuit-alteration carried out at the North Signal Goomty (of the station) in the past, and during the execution of the signalling work related to replacement of Electric Lifting Barrier for level crossing gate number 94 at the station. These lapses resulted in wrong signalling to the Coromandel Express wherein the Up Home Signal indicated Green aspect for run-through movement on the Up main line of the station, but the crossover connecting the Up main line to the Up loop line (crossover 17A/B) was set to the Up loop line,” the source said citing the report.
“The wrong signalling resulted in the Coromandel Express traversing on the Up loop line, and eventual rear-collision with the goods train standing there,” the source said.
“Lapses at multiple levels in the S&T Department were responsible for this accident,” he said referring to the report.
The source said that the report also highlighted there was a similar incident of mismatch between the intended route set by signals, and actual route taken by train on May 16 this year at the Bahanaga Bazar railway station in Kharagpur division of SER, on account of wrong wiring and cable fault.
“Had corrective measures been taken, after this incident, to address the issue of wrong-wiring, the accident at the Bahanaga Bazar railway station would not have taken place,” the source said citing the report.
The source said that in its conclusion, the CRS stated that a drive should be launched to update the completion of signalling wiring diagrams, other documents (SIP, RCC, SWRD, Panel/VDU diagrams etc.) and lettering of signaling circuits at site. The source said that the report also called for standard practices should be followed for carrying out signalling-modification work.
He said that in the report, the CRS suggested that before taking up modification of the existing signalling circuits, functional tests of the existing circuits, under alteration, should be carried out to ensure that actual circuits are in accordance with the completion drawings.
It also said that any alteration to signalling circuits should be carried out with an approved circuit diagram, and in presence of an officer. A separate team should be deployed for checking and testing of modified signalling circuits and functions before restoration or re connection of the work, the source said.
A competency certificate should be issued after a rigorous practical training for carrying out signaling modification works. Both the Execution, and Checking & Testing of Signaling-modification works should be done by staff in possession of this competency certificate
“In the event of a condition where pick up of both Normal and Reverse indication relays is detected for a point, all signal movement over that point should be prevented. In case of El, this should be registered as fault condition, and the system should shut down automatically. If the status of a point indication relay (physical relay) is “Normal, then the command for operation of the point from Reverse to Normal should not generate, and vice-versa,” the source said.
“It also said that point detection circuits should be carried in a separate cable for each point or crossover without any immediate termination, the point switch groups should be eliminated in EI installations,” the source said.
The report also suggested that provision should be made for separate logging of physical relays in the station data logger and RTU should be provided at end goomties for logging of digital and analog inputs for ensuring end to end matching of status of gears, the source said.
The report also also suggested that the station masters should be made aware of possible faulty conditions of EI system that could be detected through indications on the panel and these should also be listed and incorporated in the SWR.
At least 293 people were killed and over 1000 injured in the Odisha train accident on June 2 evening.