“Leaner, meaner army” is the creed favoured by contemporary military experts in the context of huge manpower assets devouring resources that might be more cost-effectively uitilised to upgrade technology, augment firepower etc: all aimed at attaining that other military catchphrase ~ a “bigger bang per buck”. Yet, in an Indian context, consistent efforts are made to “hit” other targets even while further bloating expensive manpower. A classic recent example is the Army’s advocacy for raising 370 new platoons (an estimated 18,000 personnel) of the Defence Security Corps (DSC) to be specially tasked, trained and equipped to “protect” the several military installations that dot the country.

No doubt scary developments at IAF Pathankot, army bases at Uri, Nagrota etc, point to the defences at such installations being alarmingly weak, but would it be unfair to suggest that the terrorist forays at those places were largely the result of the men deployed on perimeter and allied security duties being terribly lax? That some of the strikes took place when troops were being “rolled over” only underscores concerns that “internal security” at such installations is accorded limited priority. What the personnel tasked with protecting the camps etc, as well as the “station commanders”, do not seem to realise is that every successful militant foray boosts the morale of those engaged in conducting the “proxy war”. Simultaneously is shattered the public’s faith and confidence in their armed services. Surely the answer does not lie in creating a new agency to counter each type of threat: particularly when new agencies do not lead to an appreciable reduction in the size of “regular” forces?

The boosting of the DSC is one of the recommendations of an expert inter-service group that was formed after the attack at Pathankot. Other valid recommendations include issuing sophisticated weaponry and higher training standards to the personnel on guard duty. An additional expenditure of Rs 1.3 crore is estimated. Yet the DSC is manned essentially by personnel who have completed their “colour service”, and hence they are past their prime as far as the military is concerned. And while ex-servicemen do possess desirable qualities such as discipline and training, queries do arise about their “mental strength” to carry out duties as demanding as those like protecting defence installations against terrorist/militant attack.

The uniformed community might not like to hear it, but events in other spheres point to ex-servicemen not always being as efficient as projected ~ they are human too, and their years of regular service does blunt the “edge” a little. What might pay better dividends is creating a fresh culture within the forces, a culture that equates guarding installations with as much ‘josh’ as a surgical strike across established battle-lines.